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Abstract. A revised application of Ostrom’s (Ostrom, 2007) Social-Ecological
System (SES) framework to Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, G.
(1968), Science, 162(3859): 1243–1248) demonstrates that its institutional
structure is more complex than either Hardin or Ostrom had imagined. The
‘tragedy’ arises from several interacting resources and institutions. If the grass on
the pasture was not subject to appropriation, the cattle were not privately owned,
or property- and contract-enforcement institutions supporting market exchange
were absent, then the ‘tragedy of the commons’ would not have arisen regardless
of the open-access pasture. This paper highlights the utility of the SES framework
and the care required to apply it precisely to specific social-ecological situations.
1. Introduction
Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’ remains a uniquely powerful and con-
troversial contribution to both social and natural sciences. The classic allegory,
which warns of the dangers associated with situations that generate private
benefits and shared costs, is an integral part of the curricula in multiple
disciplines. Its sustained influence is a product of both its ability to successfully
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predict resource collapse (Brook et al., 2003; Edmondson et al., 1956;
Ludwig et al., 1993; Myers et al., 1997) and its myopic failure to consider
the possibility that groups of resource users might recognize the dangers of
overexploitation and successfully develop self-organized systems of common-
property governance (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1994).
The evidence concerning the viability of these small-scale common-property
systems is by now irrefutable (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009; Cox et al., 2010;
Gutie´rrez et al., 2011), although their success ultimately depends upon the fit
between common-property institutions and the complex social and ecological
environment in which they operate (Acheson, 2006; Feeny et al., 1990).
This paper expands on the issue of institutional fit in the context of Hardin’s
Herder Problem (as it is known among game theorists, e.g., Cole and Grossman,
2010) to show that destruction of the open-access pasture is not a function of
a lack of institutions but necessarily depends upon the interactions of various
rules-in-use that together generate incentives to overuse.1 Failure to recognize
the role of these institutional interactions in the Herder Problem suggests that
some institutions are so entrenched and taken for granted that even accomplished
analysts fail to diagnose the problem accurately. Moreover, inaccurate diagnoses
can lead to the deployment of ineffective policy responses that fail to grapple
with the complex, often opaquematrix of rules, norms, customs, and conventions
within which social and environmental problems arise.
To better illuminate that matrix, we employ the Social-Ecological System (SES)
framework (Ostrom, 2007, 2009;Ostrom andCox, 2010), an analytical tool that
aims to systematize data collection and integrate knowledge to understand how
a diverse assortment of social-ecological attributes and their interactions affects
the sustainability of social-ecological systems. The framework has demonstrated
its analytic utility through application to a wide range of environmental problems
(Ban et al. 2013; Basurto and Ostrom, 2009; Blanco, 2011; Cinner et al., 2012;
Fleischman et al., 2010; Gutie´rrez et al., 2011).
Notwithstanding its contributions and general acceptance by diverse scholars,
the SES framework is a complex tool that can confront an analyst with the
seemingly endless task of identifying the entire range of relevant and potentially
important social, ecological, and institutional attributes of a social-ecological
system. Although a complete account of all these factors is generally unattainable,
policy-relevant theoretical explanations must attend to all categories of the
factors that substantially structure interactions and affect outcomes in these
systems. Some of the institutions that give rise to particular patterns of behavior
may not appear immediately obvious, and identifying these hidden but still
1 Cole and Grossman (2010) argue that the Herder Problem is more in the nature of an Assurance
Game than a Prisoners’ Dilemma, but the outcome of the game may still resemble that of a Prisoners’
Dilemma depending on levels of trust, communication, etc.
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effectual institutions requires careful attention to all the categories included in
the SES framework.
In her paper introducing the SES framework, Ostrom (2007) argued for
the importance of contextual understandings of social-ecological phenomena.
Ironically, however, her application of the SES framework to Hardin’s ‘tragedy
of the commons’ neglected important attributes of the institutional environment
that play understated but significant roles in the demise of the open-access
pasture. Like Hardin, Ostrom failed to consider certain institutional conditions
that gave rise to the Herder Problem. She treated the ex ante situation in an
overly abstract and non-contextual manner. By accepting Hardin’s exclusive
focus on the absence of private property rights to the pasture, Ostrom overlooked
the contributions made by other aspects of the extant institutional context,
factors that local groups would have to take into account when they select
new institutions in pursuit of ‘alternative futures’ (V. Ostrom 2008).2
This paper shows how a failure to account for preexisting institutional
features of the environment can dramatically affect the outcome, leading to
either an overexploited or an underexploited open-access pasture. Furthermore,
the resulting diagnosis of what is needed to avoid destruction of the common
resource may be incomplete and misleading unless the groups involved can
understand how their proposed institutional innovations will interplay with
the diverse assortment of historical, cultural, and macroinstitutional features of
the surrounding environment (Clement, 2010; Larson and Soto, 2008; Pierson,
2000; Ribot et al., 2006).
Section 2 introduces the SES framework and discusses its utility for diagnosing
the attributes of a given system that jointly affect social and ecological outcomes.
Section 3 then presents Ostrom’s (2007) application of the SES framework
to Hardin’s (1968) Herder Problem, and discusses the problems with her
application. Section 4 offers a revised application of the SES framework that
draws attention to background institutional factors that include property rights
in cattle, the ‘rule of capture’ applied to the grass on the pasture, and institutions
supporting market exchange that generate the individual incentives that drive
collective destruction of the pasture. The paper concludes in Section 5 with a
discussion on implications of the analysis for both institutional fitness and, more
often overlooked, institutional interactions.
2. The SES framework
The SES framework (Figure 1) conceptualizes social-ecological systems as
partially decomposable systems (Simon, 1962) consisting of six fundamental
2 Ostrom might have been attempting merely to describe what she took to be Hardin’s
misunderstanding of the range of institutional solutions to the Herder Problem, but she does not explicitly
specify which institutions, if any, were already present in that specific situation.
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Figure 1. Basic structure of the SES framework (Ostrom, 2009) as modified by
Epstein et al. (2013).
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components. Four of these – resource systems (RS), resource units (RU), actors
(A), and governance systems (GS) – are defined by sets of attributes (Table 1)
that jointly shape interrelated processes of interaction (I), leading to observed
and evaluated outcomes (O). Resource units, as an example, are defined by
seven attributes, including: the rate at which harvested units are replaced
(RU2), their economic value (RU4), and level of mobility (RU1). Each of these
attributes has an impact on the information and incentives that actors face when
making decisions in the social-ecological system. For instance, the likelihood that
resource users will invest in activities to manage a resource is expected to form an
inverted curvilinear relation with the replacement rate of that resource (Basurto
andOstrom, 2009). At very slow replacement rates, gains in the distant future are
likely to be heavily discounted, generating few positive incentives for collective
action, while rapid replacement obviates the need for collective action over a
given range of demand.3 Thus, collective action to manage a resource is most
likely to occur in the context of resources with intermediate replacement rates.
A key feature of the framework is its explicit recognition that the effects of any
attribute of a system may be mediated by other attributes of that system, most
notably institutions that jointly influence the incentives of actors (Agrawal and
Yadama, 1997; Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). In other words, although we expect
3 If resource replacement rates are slow enough, and returns from current exploitation are high
enough, even private owners of resources can be expected to unsustainably overexploit those resources
(see Clark, 1973a, 1973b).
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Table 1. Tier-one components of the SES framework based on Ostrom (2007)
Resource systems Resource units Governance systems Actors Interactions Outcomes
Related
ecosystems
RS1 Sector
RS2 Boundary clarity
RS3 Size
RS4 Infrastructure
RS5 Productivity
RS6 Equilibrium
properties
RS7 Predictability
RS8 Storage capacity
RS9 Location
RU1 Mobility
RU2 Replacement rate
RU3 Interactions
RU4 Economic value
RU5 Size
RU6 Distinctive
markings
RU7 Distribution
GS1 Government
organizations
GS2 Non-government
organizations
GS3 Network structure
GS4 Property rights
GS5 Operational rules
GS6 Collective-choice rules
GS7 Constitutional rules
GS8 Monitoring and
sanctioning processes
A1 Group size
A2 Socioeconomic
attributes
A3 History of use
A4 Location
A5 Leadership
A6 Norms/social capital
A7 Knowledge of SES
A8 Resource dependence
A9 Technology used
I1 Harvesting
levels
I2 Information
sharing
I3 Deliberation
processes
I4 User conflicts
I5 Investment
activities
I6 Lobbying
activities
O1 Social
preference
measures
O2 Ecological
performance
measures
O3 Externalities
to other SESs
RE1 Climate
patterns
RE2 Pollution
patterns
RE3 Flows
into and
out of focal
SES
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intermediate rates of replacement to enhance prospects for collective action, a
diverse assortment of relationships may be observed, as factors such as resource
mobility (RU1), group size (A1), and property rights (GS4) vary across social-
ecological systems. A thorough diagnosis depends upon an enumeration of the
relevant attributes of a social-ecological system that are sufficient to account
for behavior and outcomes in that system. Given the complexity involved, the
SES framework is designed to allow scholars to leverage knowledge from prior
research across relevant disciplines, specifically by focusing their attention on a
smaller subset of discrete and easily coded attributes related to a particular ques-
tion ormethod of inquiry. In this way, knowledge accumulates piecewise through
iterative processes of hypothesis generation, testing, and refinement toward a
more general theory of sustainability. The danger, however, is that in focusing
only on a small subset of variables, scholars will neglect interactions among
institutions that generate substantially different outcomes. Ironically, Ostrom’s
(2007) own analysis of Hardin’s Herder Problem illustrates this very problem.
3. Ostrom’s application of the SES framework to Hardin’s Herder Problem
Ostrom (2007) sought to demonstrate the diagnostic utility of the SES framework
by applying it to Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’. In Hardin’s
description,4 herders on an open-access pasture lacked incentives to conserve that
pasture by controlling the number of cattle grazing upon it. Market incentives
guided them (as if by an ‘invisible hand’) to keep adding more and more cattle to
their herds to maximize private profits, even though doing so reduced the social
product, as the pasture deteriorated. Hardin (1968) believed the only way to
avoid destruction of the open-access pasture was to either privatize the pasture
or for governments to regulate access and use. Ostrom (1990) successfully
rebuttedHardin’s presumption that common-property solutions – self-regulation
by the herders themselves – would be ineffective. But she did not question his
presumption that property rights in the pasture were the focal institutions.
Ostrom (2007) depicted the situation, using the SES framework, as shown in
Figure 2. This figure demonstrates the utility of the SES framework by showing
how Hardin’s (1968) entire textual analysis can be condensed to a few relatively
simple variables and presented in an easy-to-understand graphical fashion. And
it shows how individual case studies – stylized and real, thickly or thinly
descriptive – might be diagnosed and compared using regularized variables. But,
most importantly, it shows that incomplete attention to the set of institutions
affecting social-ecological outcomes can lead to inappropriate diagnosis and
analysis.
4 Earlier versions had been told by Aristotle (1941, §1262b34–35) in the fourth century BCE, and
fisheries economists writing in the twentieth century CE, including Andersen (1983), Gordon (1954), and
Scott (1955).
Digging deeper into Hardin’s pasture 359
Figure 2. Ostrom’s SES diagnosis of the Herder Problem.
The most striking feature of Ostrom’s (2007) treatment of Hardin’s Herder
Problem is the complete absence of Governance System variables, as if the entire
situation is pre- or non-institutional. This might be an accurate reflection of
Hardin’s own understanding of the situation, but it is misleading. As a conceptual
matter, what could it mean for any social system, as such, to be pre-institutional,
that is, devoid of rules, norms, customs, or habits? Simply put, a social system
without an institutional structure is not a social system.
It is doubtful that Ostrom actually believed such a null set of institutions
was a practical possibility, although elsewhere (e.g., Ostrom, 1990: 2–3, 140)
she does invoke a Hobbesian state of nature (see Hobbes, [1651] 1994) to
describe the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and the default conditions under which
humans interact over common-pool resources.5 Even if Ostrom (1990) did not
intend the state of nature to be taken literally as a description of very early
5 The phrase ‘common-pool resource’ refers to a particular set of goods that are rivalrous in
consumption but from which exclusion is very costly. These are distinguished from private goods (easy
excludability and rivalrous in consumption), public goods (very costly to exclude but non-rivalrous in
consumption), and toll goods (low-cost excludability and rivalrous in consumption) (V. Ostrom and E.
Ostrom, 1977: 12, Fig. 1). These types of goods, with their varying characteristics, must not be confused
with the various property systems (private, common, public, or hybrid) that might be deployed to manage
them. Unfortunately, scholars still sometimes confuse or conflate common-pool resources with property
systems used to manage them. For a recent example, see Araral (2014: 19), observing a ‘fundamental
difference between CPR (the acronym he uses to denote common-pool resources) and private property’. A
common-pool resource system can be managed either via private property, common property, or public
property, or admixtures of the three (see, e.g., Cole, 2002; Cole and Ostrom, 2012).
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human society, the complete absence of Governance System variables reflects
a Hobbesian interpretation in which no humanly devised institution has any
relevance (i.e., would affect outcomes) in that setting.
Hardin (1968) did, of course, recommend the imposition of institutional
arrangements associated with either markets and private property or
governments and regulation to avoid the open-access tragedy. So it is not entirely
fair to accuse Hardin of being unaware of the importance of institutions. A more
reasonable criticism is that Hardin failed to realize just how institution-laden his
allegoric setting already was, prior to the imposition of any institutional solution.
Ostrom’s (1990) research unequivocally demonstrated that Hardin overlooked
viable institutional solutions, specifically common-property regimes that satisfy
the design principles she identified.6 We take Ostrom’s primary point in this
exercise to be a plausible explanation for why Hardin was unable to see other
paths that might avert the tragedy by introducing other kinds of institutions.
The specific mode of argument used by Ostrom (2007) to make this point,
however, may have a similarly narrowing effect on future analysts. By presuming
that institutions were completely absent from Hardin’s pasture (or, that it was
pre-institutional), Ostrom was drawn to suggest the addition of new institutions,
rather than investigating ways in which existing but unrecognized institutions
contributed to that tragedy in the first place, or how the continued presence of
existing institutions might undermine efforts to avert the tragedy by building
new ones.
In fact, a null set of institutions is inconsistent with the ‘tragic’ outcome that
Hardin described and Ostrom indicates as Outcome (O2) in her SES analysis.
In the absence of formal or informal institutions protecting ownership (or
possession) of cattle, herders have little if any incentive to let loose their cattle
on the open-access pasture, where others might claim them. Opportunities to
profit from selling cattle would be limited by the absence of institutions that (1)
recognize and protect ownership and (2) enforce impersonal contracts (see, e.g.,
Greif, 2005; North, 1990). Consequently, trade would be greatly restricted, and
the pasture would not likely be overgrazed. The ‘tragedy of the commons’ would
not arise.7
Ostrom (2007: 15183) observed that ‘the animals . . . grazing on the pasture
are the property of their owners’, who receive ‘all the proceeds from the sale’
6 Ostrom’s (1990: 90, Table 3.1) eight design principles are: (1) clearly defined boundaries, (2)
congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, (3) most affected individuals
participate in rule-making, (4) reliable monitoring, (5) graduated sanctions, (6) rapid and low-cost conflict-
resolution mechanisms, (7) minimal recognition and acceptance of local rules by external authorities, and
(8) local rules nested in larger governance systems (for common-property regimes that are part of larger
systems).
7 A tragedy of the commons could arise from mere subsistence use if the number of users is large
enough relative to the size of the pasture, and their demand outstrips the replacement rate of the grass.
But such a scenario is far less likely, and it is not the scenario that Hardin portrayed in his seminal paper.
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of any cattle they have grazed on the open-access pasture. But, surprisingly, her
application of the SES framework did not incorporate these social facts. Not
only are they inconsistent with her empty Governance Systems box, they are
central to Hardin’s story. The overexploitation of the pasture results directly
from the incentives created by the combination of the following institutional
elements: (1) no property rights in the pasture land; (2) private ownership of
cattle, including the right to alienate and the right to all proceeds from alienation;
(3) an implicit rule that grass is, in effect, privatized to the herder as it is consumed
and metabolized by that herder’s cattle;8 and (4) incentives stemming from the
structure of market institutions. Each of these institutional variables is a matter
of collective choice, which is to say, they could be otherwise. If one or more of
these were altered, Hardin’s tragedy might not have resulted in the first place.
4. A revised application of the SES framework to Hardin’s Herder Problem
Figure 3 revises Ostrom’s (2007) depiction of the tragedy to incorporate
institutional attributes of the social-ecological system that are needed to specify
conditions for the deterioration of an open-access pasture. Some of these changes,
most notably the explicit division between grass and cattle, are simply a matter of
reorganization to clarify their role as discrete components of the social-ecological
system. Others are novel. For example, the existence of an exogenous supply of
cattle is not mentioned in either account, but presumably the cattle have some
external origin, given that herders seem to collectively possess a large enough
supply of cattle to deplete the pasture. Herders presumably also have access
to alternative sources of feed upon which the cattle could be fattened for sale.
The most important changes, in the Governance Systems component, signify
that the tragedy of the open-access pasture is the product of interactions among
institutions that assign individual rights over the cattle that convert unowned
grass from the open-access pasture into privately owned beef.
Using the Roman law distinctions that continue to dominate modern theories
of property (Birks andMcLeod, 1987; Cole, 2002: 8–14; Cole andOstrom, 2012:
44–45),9 the pasture (i.e., the land itself) is res communes omnium (the common
property of all),10 which means that no one can exclude anyone else from entry
8 The ‘tragedy of the commons’ story is not restricted to this combination of privately owned cattle
and open-access pastureland. What is critical is that part of a publicly available resource can be captured
and used, either directly or indirectly, for private gain. An analogous tragedy might occur in the absence
of clearly defined property rights, but analysis of that case would have to incorporate transaction costs of
capturing and protecting private gains.
9 We do not mean to suggest that the set of institutions conditioning access to and use of Hardin’s
pasture is determined by Roman law or, indeed, any formal legal system. However, Roman law property
categories provide a convenient set of concepts for understanding the institutional structure of both formal
and informal legal systems.
10 The Roman property category of res communes implied an unchangeable non-property status
that is very different from modern conceptions of the phrase ‘common property’, which imply group,
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Figure 3. Revised application of the SES framework to the Herder Problem.
and use, but neither does entry and use (e.g., acts of occupation or possession)
create rights of ownership (which would signify res nullius or non-property) in
the pasture lands. The grass growing on the pasture is not res communes but res
nullius, an unowned resource available for appropriation as private property (res
privatæ) by acts of extraction or consumption. Conversion from non-property
to property occurs via the ‘rule of capture’, which applies to many ‘wild’ natural
resources, including not only wild animals and fish but also groundwater, oil,
and gas, and in this case, unowned grass on the open-access pasture (see, e.g.,
Johnston, 2005). The cattle that graze on the grass are res privatæ, owned by
the herders who release them onto the pasture to feed. Because the cattle are
domesticated animals, they remain private property even after they leave the
land of their owners; they do not become open for recapture by others following
their release onto the commons (see, e.g., Ingham, 1900). While on the pasture,
the cattle serve, in effect, as agents of the herders, converting the grass from
communal, or collective ownership. Today, as Araral (2014: 19) observes, ‘common property’ can denote
a special form of private property; that is, property owned by more than a single individual. However,
other modern forms of common property, such as tribal property or communes, appear more like public
than private property (see, e.g., Cole and Ostrom, 2012: 44, Fig. 2.1).
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open-access to private property simply by consuming it. We know this by virtue
of the fact that the value of the added weight of each cow, attributable to grass
consumed from the pasture, belongs entirely to that cow’s owner when the cow
is sold in market.
These various property rules, as applied to the pasture, the grass, the cattle,
and their owners, are a fortiori institutions. They are not socially immutable
‘brute facts’ about the world but inherently alterable ‘institutional facts’ (see
Searle, 1995). They belong to the Governance Systems box because they all
play a significant role in driving behavior in and outcomes of Hardin’s Herder
Problem. Changing one or more of these property rules could easily alter the
outcome because the ecological components of a system are inextricably linked
via a variety of natural processes (Araral, 2013; Holling and Meffe, 1996).
Imagine, for example, if the law treated domesticated animals just as it does
wild animals so that any cow released (or escaping) onto the open-access pasture
would become res nullius (just like the grass) and liable to recapture by anyone
(see Arnold, 1921; Ingham, 1990). How likely would a herder be to release the
first, let alone the next (or the nth), cow onto the pasture? The pasture would
more likely be underutilized than overexploited. Or, what if the grass were not res
nullius but res communes so that even after consumption by a herder’s cow, all
members of the community would have a right to share in the increased market
value of that cow attributable to the amount of grass it consumed from the
common pasture? Measurement problems would arise, but such a rule would
also alter the incentives for overgrazing, as much as if the pasture itself was
privatized.11
This is not to argue that any of the several property rules at work on
Hardin’s pasture should be different than it is – the analysis here is positive,
not normative. There may be excellent socioeconomic reasons supporting the
existing set of institutions, even if those choices in the aggregate contribute to
potential commons tragedies.
Other background institutions play an integral role in Hardin’s allegory.
For one, private property rights (and correlative duties) in the cattle require
enforcement mechanisms. In addition, Hardin presumes the existence of
functional markets for cattle-based products, and such markets require money
(or barter) and contracts plus contract-enforcement mechanisms. In the absence
11 Such a sharing rule is not fanciful. Rechlin et al. (2002), for example, discuss community forest
systems in China and Nepal that require sharing of monetary and material benefits from forest harvests
with all stakeholders. Somewhat closer to the present context, the great French novelist Victor Hugo, in
his masterpiece Les Mise´rables ([1862] 1887: 75–76), discusses mid-mountain peasants who share the
proceeds of the cattle they graze to produce cheese. In other cultures, a number of herders may own
various shares of cows grazed on a common pasture (see Mors, 1954). This is not to argue normatively
for such a solution to a potential commons tragedy. We are merely making an analytical point about
variability of property institutions.
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of institutions supporting market exchange, herders would graze cattle only for
their use value, thereby reducing pressure on the pasture.12
Some resource systems and institutions left out of Hardin’s allegory entirely,
as well as Ostrom’s application to it of the SES framework, can play a major
role in determining social and ecological outcomes. To take only one example,
cattle do not live by grass alone but also require water (Ensminger and Rutten,
1991: 688). Where is the water on or near Hardin’s pasture? And what rules
or norms govern its use? Without answers to these questions, any SES analysis
of Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ must remain incomplete. It is, however,
a virtual certainty that without some reliable water source for the cattle, the
pasture would not be overgrazed.
5. Institutional interactions and institutional fit
This paper has shown that a myopic preoccupation with a single institutional
variable applied to a single resource system (property rights in the pasture) while
neglecting related and interacting resources (the grass and the cattle), and the
institutions that condition human interactions with those resources, can result in
impoverished analyses and misdiagnoses. If the Governance System in Hardin’s
Herder Problem were truly a null set, as both Ostrom (2007) and Hardin (1968)
treated it, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ would not have arisen. In an institutional
vacuum, atomistic herders would lack incentives to graze more cows than they
could physically protect from misappropriation.
Conceptually, the notion of a pre- or non-institutional social system is
a contradiction in terms. Empirically, the world we inhabit is replete with
institutions that prescribe what actions must, must not, or may be taken given
certain conditions (Coleman, 1987; Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Elster, 2007).
While some institutions, notably reciprocity norms, enable groups to solve a
diverse assortment of social dilemmas (Axelrod, 1984; Fehr et al., 2002; Ostrom,
1998, 2009), others constrain, limit, or undermine cooperation, equality, and
collective well-being (North, 1990). Any system of institutional arrangements is,
as a consequence, deeply complex.
Our analysis also has implications for the notion of ‘institutional fit’, which
suggests that institutions ought to fit or match the defining features of the
problems they are meant to address (Folke et al., 2007; Young, 2002, 2008).
This paper demonstrates that institutional fitness is not just a matter of relations
between discrete institutions and ecological circumstances but also concerns
how various institutions (and sets of institutions) affecting resources interact
12 On the distinction between ‘use value’ and ‘exchange value’, see, for example, Smith ([1776]
1994: 31). Note the implication that whether a commodity possesses exchange value or only use value
depends substantially on the institutional setting and not simply on its scarcity (available supply relative
to demand).
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with each other. Simply put, institutional fit is about both (1) how the rules fit
the biophysical conditions and (2) how the rules fit with other rules. In fact,
some have argued that Ostrom’s (1990) successful common-property regimes
are better understood as a special case of collective private property that depend
upon interactions between shared appropriation and management rights within
a group, and the ability to apply those rights to exclude other groups (Araral,
2014).13 Moreover, viewed in isolation, the absence of a property regime
governing access to and use of a pasture cannot lead to any predictions about
the level of use. Indeed, as Libecap (1989: 13–14) has explained, open-access
may be economically optimal in conditions where supply is high and demand
is low so that the costs of introducing and enforcing property rights and duties
(among other institutions) would outweigh the benefits. Open-access is, in fact,
the default condition in the absence of institutions (including social norms)
created through collective action.
Institutional studies of commons and social-ecological systems often support
an optimistic view regarding the potential for institutional change to lead to
sustainable and equitable use of natural resources across diverse human societies.
But sustainability is not merely a question of finding the best institution for
a given environmental problem. Rather, multiple, interacting institutions in
complex social-ecological systems generate incentives that can either support
or degrade resource sustainability, among other social goals.
No single analysis can detail all the institutional arrangements that might
conceivably affect outcomes in a complex social-ecological system, but analysts
must work hard to avoid overlooking especially important institutional factors.
Ostrom (2007: 15181) intended the SES framework to be ‘a step toward building
a strong interdisciplinary science of complex, multilevel systems that will enable
future diagnosticians to match governance arrangements to specific problems
embedded in a social-ecological context’. Ironically, she stopped short in her
own SES-based analysis of Hardin’s allegory of the ‘tragedy of the commons’,
but this paper demonstrates the power of the SES framework to point out such
mistakes and suggest further improvements in our collective understanding.
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ is not a consequence of the absence of
institutions but instead a set of maladapted institutions that support incentives
for overexploitation. The appropriate response is not necessarily to create new
institutions; an alteration in existing institutional arrangements may sometimes
be sufficient. Even when new institutions seem desirable, they must be analyzed
within the context of the existing set of institutions with which they must
interact.
The open-access pasture does not exist in splendid isolation but operates
within a larger universe of interacting resources and institutions. Hardin’s
13 But see note 10 above, observing that common-property regimes may closely resemble either group
private ownership or certain forms of public ownership.
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‘tragedy of the commons’ is not just about the pasture; it is equally about the
grass, the cows, the herders, and the human society.
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